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THE C.I.A. AND HOW IT GREW



NEW C.I.A. CHIEF: William F. Raborn, left, who was appointed last week by President Johnson as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. At right is the C.I.A. headquarters in McLean Va. Seal is the official C.I.A. emblem.

Associated Press, Air Photographers Inc.

By JACK RAYMOND
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—After John A. McCone succeeded Allen W. Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence a few years ago, one veteran of the agency compared the two men as follows: "Allen Dulles ran a happy ship—or at least he did until the Bay of Pigs. John McCone runs a taut ship."

The nautical metaphore, applied to the civilians, came to mind this week as a retired admiral, William Francis Raborn Jr., was named to succeed Mr. McCone. Whether Red Raborn, a jovial, popular military man, can pilot the Central Intelligence Agency as both a *happy* and a *taut* ship he will have ample chance to demonstrate in the inevitably stormy times ahead.

His surprise appointment, however, posed the question whether he, with relatively little experience in high level intelligence work, was suited to the job; and what is the job?

The official job description identifies the director of the C.I.A. as the President's chief intelligence adviser and his representative on the United States Intelligence Board, which includes the heads of the intelligence organizations at the State Department, Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation and military services plus representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The entire board discusses and assesses intelligence information—advances in the military power of certain foreign countries, forecasts of major political shifts abroad, and other developments that may affect national security. But it is the C.I.A. director who coordinates all views and his recommendations have official primacy.

Wide Range

He is more than the chairman of a board, however. He has his own huge "shop." The C.I.A. director runs one of the most far-flung intelligence organizations in United States history and if it is not the world's greatest, it is certainly the most publicized.

The role of the C.I.A. in the overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Iran and Laos; in developing and operating reconnaissance planes, and in helping to direct the abortive Cuban rebellion at the Bay of Pigs is common knowledge.

True and false, reports of C.I.A. activity flood the world press constantly. But some of the publicity attached to the agency—and its director—derives from the peculiarly American practice in which [illegible] public speeches and testify before Congress.

The C.I.A. is probably the only intelligence organization ever to hold a news conference—in January, 1964, to put out information it had on a decline in the Soviet economy. It even has an official emblem that adorns the director's stationery among other papers.

Instead of working in a nondescript, secret hideaway, the director of the C.I.A. presides at a $46 million headquarters building. Its location at nearby Langley, Va., is known to all. The total personnel, supposedly secret, is estimated at more than 20,000. The annual budget, also a secret, is estimated at from $500 million to $2 billion.

The C.I.A. director's foremost responsibility, of course, is to satisfy the President's need for full and speedy information. But his task is affected also by another peculiarly American aspect, and that is the prevailing distrust of his mission. Elsewhere, government intelligence activity is accepted without question. In this country, although carried on since the days of Washington, it has been frowned upon as somehow indecent and undemocratic.

The C.I.A. director, therefore, [illegible] justifying his organization's existence, especially before Congress. Certain small committees of Congress control the C.I.A.'s appropriations and are briefed regularly on its operations. But there has been a movement for years to create a Congressional "watchdog" committee that would exercise even greater controls.

Leadership

Finally, in any noting of the responsibilities of the C.I.A. director, there is leadership. Allen Dulles, listing this high in the requirements of the job, says that the members must be dedicated, must feel they are part of an élite outfit and that their individual tasks are crucial to the safety of the nation.

Admiral Raborn will be the seventh Director of Central Intelligence, the fifth since the agency was founded on its present basis 18 years ago. He will be the fifth chief with a military background, the third to come from the Navy.

Most of the early C.I.A. tasks were quasi-military. But with General Bedell Smith's appointment as director in October, 1950, the C.I.A.'s responsibilities expanded to cope not only with Soviet military belligerence but the

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subversive nature of the Communist threat around the world.

Gen. Bedell Smith ran the C.I.A. along military lines. He had tremendous prestige and a veteran of the agency recalls that many of its own officials were "frightened of him." But he established confidence in the agency among those who worked for it and those who depended upon it.

If C.I.A. activities at this point grew in variety and delicacy, perhaps this was due also to the fact that Gen. Bedell Smith's deputy for a long time was the imaginative Mr. Dulles.

The brother of the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and member of a distinguished family of officers and diplomats, Mr. Dulles had been professionally engaged in intelligence operations since World War I. With his appointment in February, 1953, to the top post, the C.I.A. for the first time had a civilian director.

"Master Spy"

Led by a professional, the agency flourished. Mr. Dulles became known as America's "master spy." His most rousing failure, the downing of the U-2 plane, was also his most rousing success, as it was revealed that the United States had secretly criss-crossed the Soviet Union on reconnaissance missions for four years.

But when Mr. Dulles retired, Nov. 29, 1961, after the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs, public furor centered on the charge that the agency had indulged in operations that went far beyond its intended primary role as an intelligence gathering and coordinating body. Significantly, however, when Mr. McCone took over the C.I.A. President Kennedy reaffirmed the C.I.A.'s operational responsibilities.

The change in command to a big businessman who had served as Under Secretary of the Air Force and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission provided a contrast that underscored some recent problems of the director's job.

As noted, Mr. Dulles ran a happy ship. The agents knew him as a colleague. He bore down on what he considered essentials, sacrificed lesser objectives if necessary. He believed in "compartmentalizing" the agency. If sometimes the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing, this was precisely what the C.I.A. director intended.

Some Confusion

When Mr. McCone came in, he tightened the management. He set up business-like echelons of command in which he dealt with five key deputies or "vice presidents." He saw outside agents only occasionally. He introduced interoffice memos. He succeeded to some extent in re-establishing confidence in C.I.A. operations, but the esprit of the place seemed to suffer.

C.I.A. men do not blame Mr. McCone, however. They say President Johnson has not had any meetings with the C.I.A. director and his aides; that he has tended to support the Pentagon's burgeoning defense intelligence agency rather than the C.I.A.

In view of all this, the challenge to Admiral Raborn appears to be twofold: to strengthen the management of the C.I.A. and its relationship to the White House and to restore the confidence of the C.I.A. personnel in their mission. For both challenges the 59-year-old Admiral Raborn has good credentials.

He gained fame as the manager of the Polaris missile program and its complicated scientific, military and production problems. In doing so, he also demonstrated a capacity for inspiring the most cynical plant workers around the country as he exhorted them to beat delivery dates.

If the fact that Admiral Raborn has had virtually no experience in high level intelligence operations is a handicap, then the choice of Richard M. Helms as his deputy balances it. For Red Raborn, in his Polaris achievement, listened to his experts. In Mr. Helms, he has an expert.

There is little question that Mr. Helms will have the day-to-day responsibility of running the agency, while popular Red Raborn, the team captain, will be cheering on the men in the field and winning friends for them at the White House and Capitol Hill. He may even, for the first time in American history, win some respectability for what Allen Dulles calls "the craft of intelligence."